We investigate the impacts of improved intellectual property rights (IPR) protection on crossborder M&A performance. Using multiple measures of IPR protection and based on generalized difference-in-differences estimates, we find that countries with better IPR protection attract significantly more hi-tech cross-border M&A activity, particularly in developing economies. Moreover, acquirers pay higher premiums for companies in countries with better IPR protection, and there is a significantly higher acquirer announcement effect associated with these hi-tech transactions.
Introduction
In recent decades, we have witnessed rapid growth in technology-oriented industries and crossborder investment activities, including M&As, Greenfield investments, outsourcing, and so on. Accordingly, the concept of intellectual property rights (IPR) has captured significant attention from companies, domestic and foreign, as well as from many government agencies. The wide variance in levels of IPR development and enforcement across countries is particularly notable; although studies suggest a positive relationship between patent protection and innovation (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1990; Scotchmer and Green, 1990) , an emerging body of evidence shows that the strength of patent protection actually has little impact on innovation (Qian, 2007; Bessen and Meurer, 2008; Lerner, 2009; Mokyr, 2009 ). Furthermore, although there is a growing consensus that institutional factors matter to economic growth (e.g., Bowen and Clercq, 2008) , a debate remains on the impact of IPR reforms on local economies (see Helpman, 1993; Lanjouw, 1998; McCalman, 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Gould and Gruben, 1996; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003; Markusen, 2001; Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006) . It thus remains a challenge to reconcile the evidence with theoretical predictions that stronger IPR encourages innovation and economic growth.
Innovation is more of a business process that turns an invention into a commodity with commercial value (Miller and Morris, 1999) . It is therefore possible to measure the outcome of innovation in ways other than by considering the quantity of patent applications.
1 In this paper, we measure the effects of improved IPR protection by analyzing cross-border M&As, which are potentially significant due to their increased number. Studies show that the transfer of technical and managerial skills and/or capital from acquiring firms to target firms creates value (e.g. Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2008) 2 . Successful transfers of knowledge, however, depend on many factors such as enhanced IPRs (Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley, 2006) . We argue that strengthening IPR 1 For example, Moser (2005) uses a large sample from nineteenth-century World Fairs to show that patent laws affect the direction of technological change. Cohen et al. (2002) study how patent law affects R&D intra-industry spillover. Allred and Park (2007) analyze effects of IPR protections on R&D. 2 Song and Shin (2008) show that MNCs have set up R&D labs overseas and outsource knowledge from the host countries of their labs.
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in host countries encourages cross-border M&As, especially the transactions in the hi-tech sector, in which intellectual property is of prime importance.
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The primary goal of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether strengthened IPR drives the frequency of cross-border hi-tech M&As and the corresponding benefits provided to the acquirers and target firms as measured by the premiums they receive. 4 We expect that the effects of improved IPR protection vary depending on the host country's level of economic development and institutional quality. Lerner (2002) reaches a similar conclusion, finding that improvements in patent protection have greater effects in nations with weaker institutions and greater economic development. Several recent studies present results supporting this observation (e.g., Qiang, 2008; Awokuse and Yin, 2010; Branstetter and Saggi, 2011; Kanwar, 2012) . Therefore, we contend that improving IPR has more significant effects on hi-tech, cross-border M&As in developing economies with weaker IPR.
Our research also sheds light on cross-border M&As, an important form of foreign direct investment and a major corporate activity that has been studied extensively. Recent studies show that cross-border M&As have brought value to acquiring firms (e.g., Allen and Pantzalis, 1996 , Doukas and Lang, 2003 , Doukas and Kan, 2006 , especially those buying targets in developing markets since the late 1990s (Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010) .
Such value-adding transactions, however, only account for a small proportion of cross-border
M&As because of the host countries' less developed institutional infrastructure such as legal and law enforcement. If host countries can mitigate such concerns and thereby encourage more crossborder M&As especially in the hi-tech field, the market should recognize such benefits. We examine this hypothesis by studying the announcement effects of those cross-border deals.
The measurement of the quality of intellectual property rights would be crucial in answering our research questions. Acknowledging the challenge of measuring IPR protection empirically, we use three measures of IPR to test our hypotheses. The first is based on the events that enhance host countries' IPR protections significantly. Specifically, using the list constructed 3 Institutional changes often echo with economic growth that will likely contribute to higher number of crossborder M&As in general. To test the impact of IPRs in particular, we study the change in the components of crossborder M&As, rather the change in the volume of all cross-border M&As.
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by Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) and the adoption of the Paris Convention (Khoury and Peng, 2010), 5 we identify 28 countries that experienced significant IPR reforms recently. The second measure is the adoption of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
The World Trade Organization (WTO) requires its members to comply with minimum copyright, trademark, and patent protection regulations as specified by the Agreement on TRIPS. By the end of 2008, WTO had accepted 154 members since its establishment in 1995, all of whom are required to comply with TRIPS at various times, depending on the economic development of the member country. The fact that countries comply with TRIPS at different times provides a natural environment in which to test the effects of IPR on cross-border, hi-tech M&As. Kyle and McGahan (2012) use TRIPS as a measurement of patent protection and find that the impact of TRIPS on R&D in new drugs varies depending on whether the host country is a developed or developing country. The third measure we use is the Ginarte-Park index as a more nuanced measure (GinartePark, 1997) .
We are aware that one of the common drawbacks of all these measures is the lack of enforcement components of IPR protection. Ostergard (2000) argues that the scarcity of quantitative research in the enforcement measurements of IPR protection makes the research in the effects of IPR protection challenging. IPR protection therefore may be overestimated by the measures that do not take enforcement into account. This measurement issue, however, has downward bias on our hypothesis because we would not be able to capture any IPR effect on cross- The second approach is a generalized difference-in-differences (DID) regression analysis.
Since Ashenfelter and Card (1985) , the DID method has become an increasingly popular way to 6 One may argue that the percentage of high-tech firms in a country grows after an IPR event due to better protection and the percentage of hi-tech M&As will increase mechanically. We think that this may not be the case for the following reasons. The percentage of cross-border M&As, especially hi-tech related ones, in less developed countries is not a majority. The host countries' institutional development is often cited as the main reason. It is therefore not because of lack the potential targets that slows the hi-tech related cross-border M&As. We conjecture that without IPR improvement, the increase in the number of hi-tech related firms in host countries will not necessarily lead to more hi-tech related M&As. Furthermore, tighter IPRs do not lead to higher percentage of high-tech firms unambiguously, given the debate on the effects of IPRs on local economies. For example, Helpman (1993) argues that the innovation rate actually decreases, not increases, in the long-run after the tightening of IPRs. The percentage of hi-tech firms may actually reduce after tighter IPRs in less developed countries. This is because it becomes more costly to imitate externally developed technology and it costs significantly more to produce innovation internally. Many hi-tech firms depending on imitation may not be able to survive after tighter IPRs.
estimate causal relationships. In this study, we construct an extensive database that contains crossborder deals involving targets from countries all over the world with significant IPR reforms.
Using country-by-year data over 29 years, we apply a standard DID analysis to compare the percentage of hi-tech, cross-border M&As before and after IPR reforms. Controlling for countryfixed effects, the results show that IPR reforms do promote hi-tech cross-border M&As and that the effect is stronger in nonadvanced economies. The results hold even after we include other country factors that have been shown to impact the likelihood of mergers between two countries (Erel, et al., 2012) , such as economic growth and trade openness. The results of the country-fixed regression analysis shows that both TRIPS and the Ginarte- The remainder of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 reviews data sources and hypotheses design. Section 3 discusses the impact of IPR reforms on trends in cross-border M&A 9 activities and the premiums targets receive. Section 4 presents the impact of IPR reforms on the announcement effects for acquirers. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature and Hypotheses
Although there is a growing consensus that institutional factors matter to economic growth (e.g., Bowen and Clercq, 2008) , a debate remains on the impact of IPR reforms on local economies.
For example, some argue that tighter intellectual property rights only benefits the large companies based in industrial countries by strengthening their monopoly power, to the detriment of the less developed countries (Helpman, 1993 Whether the tighter IPRs will result in accelerated rate of innovation is also not conclusive.
Helpman (1993) shows that the rate of innovation actually declines in the long-run after the tightening of IPRs even though it may rise initially. Chin and Grossman (1990) and Deardorff (1992) also show formally that the innovations created by the additional IPRs may be incremental and negligible given that patents are already available to protect much of the global market.
With the presence of active FDI, however, the developed countries may gain from the tighter IPRs in the less developed countries (Helpman, 1993) . FDIs had focused on labor-intensive industries because of the concerns of poor institutional development such as the law of property rights and its enforcement. The trend clearly shows that the majority of the cross-border deals are between developed markets (e.g., about 83.8% of transactions by U.S. acquirers are in advanced economies). Many factors may contribute to the relatively small number of transactions involving targets from LDCs, and IPR protection is a significant one. For example, hi-tech acquirers may be afraid of jeopardizing core technology when working with targets in countries with poor IPR protection. Coeurderoy and Murray (2008) and Maekelburger et al. (2012) show that institutional safeguards such as IPR protection determine entrepreneurial firms' choice of foreign market entry modes. Hagedoorn et al. (2005) document that IPR protection is a significant factor for a firm's choice of international R&D partner.
Multinationals can benefit more from the tighter IPRs in LDCs by shifting more technology intensive production to take the advantage of the lower labor cost in the host countries while avoiding the spillover of the fruit of their R&D. Thus the tighter IPRs in LDCs may encourage more FDIs, especially in the high-tech oriented industries. Cross-border M&A is an important form of FDI. Our first objective, therefore, is to examine whether the tighter IPRs in LDCs result in more inbound cross-border M&As in LDCs.
The tighter IPRs in LDCs may not lead to more hi-tech related M&As in the local economies though. The domestic R&D spillover can be achieved through many mechanisms, and probably less costly ones, other than M&As. For example, the private knowledge created by individual firms can be spilled over to the other firms in the industry by interaction and movement of people (Feinberg and Majumdar, 2001 ).
On the other hand, the increased cross-border M&As may also benefit the target firms.
Although the tighter IPRs increase the attractiveness of the LDCs to multinational firms, not all firms in the host country are equal. Even in economies with weak IPRs, only those firms who have invested in the creation of knowledge in a particular area have the capabilities to recognize and realize the value of externally-generated knowledge and thus can successfully make use of those innovations of others from positive R&D spillover. These firms with such capacity will become the most attractive potential targets in cross-border M&As. To compete for the best targets and benefit from the positive FDI spillover due to the tighter IPRs in the host countries, acquirers may be willing to pay a premium to those targets to recognize their technology capabilities. We next examine whether acquirers pay a premium to the targets from countries with tightened IPRs.
Lastly but not the least, we examine whether acquirers gain from the cross-border M&As in LDCs with tighter IPRs. M&A studies show that the transfer of technical and managerial skills and/or capital from acquiring firms to target firms creates value (Errunza and Senbet, 1981, Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010, and Bena and Li, 2013) .
Successful transfers of knowledge, however, depend on many factors. For instance, Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) show that enhanced IPR accelerates technology transfer within multinational firms. The tighter IPRs in the host countries may enable more value creating crossborder M&As that increase acquirer shareholders' value.
Measurements of IPR Protection
Many countries improved their intellectual property rights (IPR) in the past two decades. To quantify this improvement, we use three measures from the literature: whether the country experiences significant IPR events, whether the country joins WTO and therefore complies with TRIPS, and how well the country implements and enforces IPR. We explain these measures in detail.
Significant IPR Events
To determine whether a country experienced significant IPR reforms, we first use the measurements created by Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) . We utilize both the measurement from Branstetter, et al. (2006) and the Paris Convention to identify whether a target country in a cross-border M&A transaction experienced significant IPR reforms recently. We identify 28 countries. 
The Ginarte-Park Index
The third measure is the Ginarte-Park Index, 14 used in several studies (e.g., Ginarte-Park, 1997) .
Briefly, the index is constructed for each of the 110 countries in the sample, quinquentially from 1960 to 2005. The index incorporates five characteristics of patent laws: extent of coverage, membership in international agreements, provision for loss protection, enforcement mechanisms, and duration of protection. Each of those categories is scored from 0 to 1 and therefore the index 13 ranges from 0 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger levels of protection. Although there is some overlap among the Ginarte-Park Index, IPR reforms, and TRIPS, the index is continuous and more nuanced.
We are aware that one of the common drawbacks of all these measures is the lack of enforcement components of IPR protection. Ostergard (2000) argues that the scarcity of quantitative research in the enforcement measurements of IPR protection makes the research in the effects of IPR protection challenging. IPR protection therefore may be overestimated by the measures that do not take enforcement into account. This measurement issue, however, has downward bias on our hypothesis because we would not be able to capture any IPR effect on cross- 
Data Sources and Hypotheses Development
We utilize several databases and large data sets to examine our research questions. Specifically, to test the impact of strengthened IPR on hi-tech, cross-border M&As and on target premiums, we use cross-country data for cross-border M&As in all countries. To test the announcement effects of acquiring firms, we focus on U.S. acquirers. by the market value of the acquired shares. 18 We collect data for all the completed cross-border
Data for Analyzing the Trends in Hi-Tech, Cross-Border M&As and the Premiums in Countries with IPR Reforms
M&As involving the purchase of a controlling interest of a public target that has market values available four weeks prior to the transaction. Due to information availability, the final sample falls to 2,648 transactions meeting our selection criteria from 1986 to 2008, covering 71 countries.
Data for the Announcement Effects of Acquirers
To study how target countries' IPR reforms affects acquirers' valuations, we focus on cross-border M&As conducted by U.S. firms. Specifically, our data includes all international M&As conducted by nonfinancial U.S. firms from 1980 to 2008, including incomplete deals. The initial sample includes 15,984 deals involving 159 target countries. We obtain the identities of the firms, the 16 The share of exports and imports in total GDP, measured at current international prices using the variable openc. 17 We identify the tax-haven countries according to Desai et al. (2006) . 18 The target's market value four weeks prior to the transaction is provided by SDC.
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status of the transactions (completed or not), the transaction values, the deal attitudes (friendly or hostile), the primary four-digit SIC codes for the firms, the tender-offer flag, the payment methods, the number of SIC codes in which the targets are active, the number of shares acquired owned by the acquirer after the deal, and the market value of the target firms four weeks prior to the announcement.
The Impact of IPR Reforms on Trends in Cross-Border M&As and the Premiums
First, we analyze the impact of strengthened IPR on the trend of hi-tech, cross-border M&As. We present the summary statistics in Table 2 . Columns 1 to 3 present the cross-border M&As involving targets from IPR countries. There are 1,449 deal attempts (meaning some may be incomplete) before the IPR reforms and 17,100 attempts after. Of these 17,100 attempts, 16.4%
involve hi-tech targets, 18.0% involve hi-tech acquirers, and 13.2% involve both hi-tech acquirers and targets. These proportions are significantly larger than before the IPR reforms: 9.2%, 10.1%, and 7.2%, respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
This proportion pattern also appears in the group of completed deals. Although the overall completion ratio goes down slightly after IPR reforms (to 71.0% from 73.8%), the completion ratio for hi-tech M&As increases significantly after IPR reforms (from 63.5% to 75.3%). Deals that may lead to more technology transfer are more likely to close after IPR reforms. In columns 4 to 6 and columns 7 to 9, we also present the domestic and outbound M&As conducted by the firms in the IPR countries. The increase in hi-tech transactions is also present in these two groups of M&As.
The univariate results suggest that strengthened IPRs are related to a higher number of hitech, cross-border M&As and faster growth of such transactions. It is possible, however, that improved IPR encourages domestic hi-tech M&As for similar reasons. The changes are also likely due to overall propensity changes. As explained, we test these hypotheses in the next section by adjusting the overall propensity factor. In sum, the propensity analysis confirms that IPR reforms increase the proportion of a country's inbound hi-tech M&As significantly. In sum, the results in Table 3 suggest two findings. First is that hi-tech related cross-border M&As in host countries with tighter IPRs are more sensitive to the global trend of hi-tech M&As. This means that when there is a higher demand of hi-tech targets, acquirers will consider firms from the host countries with tighter IPRs as potential targets. Second, which is more relevant to our test, is that there is an abnormal increase in the hi-tech related cross-border M&As that cannot be explained by the global trend after IPRs, suggesting the significant impact of IPR reforms on the pattern of the host countries' hi-tech related deals. A similar pattern, however, does not exist for the domestic M&As and outbound M&As in those IPR countries.
Controlling for Overall Propensity Changes

Generalized Difference-in-Differences Regression Analysis
In this section, we apply a more formal analysis of the impact of IPR reforms on the trend of crossborder hi-tech M&As by applying a difference-in-differences approach. We estimate the following country-level regression:
where j indexes for country and t for year. Country and year fixed effects are denoted by αj and βt.
HitechRatiojt is the proportion of hi-tech targets among completed cross-border M&As in which acquirers own over 50% of the target after the transaction. IPR is a dummy 
Premium Analysis
To study the benefits IPR reforms bring to target countries, we examine the premiums that targets receive. The results are in Table 5 . Due to information availability, the number of observations in the final sample reduces significantly to 2,648 transactions meeting our selection criteria for 1986-2008 and covers 71 countries.
[ INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] Columns 1 to 3 present the results of the regression analysis of the target premiums for transactions in nonadvanced economies. Targets from countries with IPR reforms experience significantly higher premiums than those from countries without IPR reforms, suggesting that IPR reforms not only attract more acquirers, but also make them willing to pay higher prices. If this is the case because of the value created through the transfer of intangible assets and/or investment in hi-tech projects, the effect should be more evident among hi-tech targets but not necessarily among manufacturing targets. Indeed, the interaction of IPR and Hi-tech is significant and positive.
The interaction variable of Ginarte-Park Index and hi-tech targets also has significant and positive impact on target premiums. The coefficient of the interaction variable TRIPS and Hi-tech is positive, too; however, it is not as significant as the other two proxies of IPR protection. This is 22 We also conduct the DID analysis in a group of completed but uncontrolled M&As. If acquirers value IPR, such an impact should also exist among the deals that do not involve transfers of ownership control, in which case the acquirers have less control over their investments. The untabulated results show that IPR reforms increase the proportion of noncontrolled, hi-tech cross-border M&As, too, although not to the same degree and significance.
consistent with the limitation of TRIPS, in that it does not capture the actual IPR protection in a country.
We include control variables from existing literature. For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that shareholder protection plays a significant role in explaining M&A trends. We report that targets from common law countries, which should have better shareholder protections, receive higher premiums. However, this is only true for targets from advanced economies, in which the general institutional quality is stronger. We also find that when the target firm is in a tax-haven country, the premium is lower. These results suggest that although tax-haven countries may attract acquirers, the targets in those countries do not necessarily receive higher premiums.
The Impact of IPR Reforms on Announcement Effects for Acquirers
In this section, we provide evidence that strengthened IPR affects acquirers' valuations. Because this analysis requires detailed financial and stock information for the acquiring firms, we focus on cross-border M&As conducted by U.S. firms, which account for the highest value of cross-border M&As in those IPR countries.
Announcement Effects
There are several studies regarding the positive announcement effects for acquiring firms in crossborder M&As involving financially segmented markets or emerging markets (Francis, Hasan, and Sun, 2008; Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar, 2010) . Beyond finding positive announcement effects, we also identify the significant impact of strengthened IPR on the important role of hi-tech M&As.
We use the standard event-study approach. Table 6 presents the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of acquiring firms. To be comparable with the existing literature, we include completed transactions and exclude deals with transaction values that are less than 1% of the acquirer's market value four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement. This reduces the total number of observations to 2,930. The results show that, consistent with previous studies, acquirers of targets from nonadvanced economies experience a 2.551% CARs (column 5), which is significantly higher than the 1.116% (column 1) CARs for acquirers of targets in advanced economies. The difference is at the 1% significance level. These findings are consistent with Francis et al. (2008) and Chari et al. (2010) , which find that acquirers from developed markets experience significantly higher announcement effects when buying targets from developing markets.
[ INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] Importantly, the results in column 9 of Table 6 indicate that deals involving hi-tech firms drive the significantly higher announcement effects involving targets from nonadvanced economies. For example, the average announcement effect for U.S. acquirers of hi-tech targets from nonadvanced economies is 5.691% (column 5), which is 4.638% higher than for U.S.
acquirers of hi-tech targets from advanced economies. When the cross-border transactions do not involve hi-tech targets, there is no significant difference between the announcement effects for acquirers of targets in nonadvanced economies and acquirers of targets in advanced economies. A similar pattern holds when splitting the sample into large and small acquirers. These results support Errunza and Senbet (1981) in that a major benefit of cross-border M&As is the transfer of acquirers' technology to target firms, especially those in economies with inferior products and labor markets.
Acquirers and investors may not realize the potential synergy, however, if they are not confident that the transferred technology will be protected. We find that when acquirers conduct hi-tech, cross-border deals in countries without IPR reforms, the announcement effect is insignificant. Columns 6 to 8 show that hi-tech deals (especially ones involving the purchase of a controlling interest) in countries with recent IPR reforms drive the higher announcement effects in nonadvanced economies. Those U.S. acquirers that conduct hi-tech deals in countries without IPR reforms experience negative or insignificant returns.
The results in columns 10 and 11 confirm that hi-tech deals in countries with IPR reforms drive the significant difference in acquirers' announcement effects. For deals that do not involve hi-tech companies, and for hi-tech deals that do not involve IPR reforms, the difference in announcement effects between buying targets in advanced economies and nonadvanced economies is not statistically significant.
We also present the results of similar tests for large and small acquirers in Table 6 . Acquirer size has a significant impact, statistically and economically, on M&A announcement effects (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004) . Furthermore, Francis, Hasan, and Sun (2008) show that 23 large acquirers benefit most from transactions involving targets from emerging markets. Thus, we classify firms as Large (Small) acquirers if their market capitalization is greater (equal to or less) than the market capitalization of the 25th percentile of NYSE firms in the acquisition year. The previous patterns remain for both groups, suggesting that target countries' IPR is a significant factor for the shareholders of acquiring firms, regardless of the size of the acquirer. Table 7 presents the regression analysis of acquiring firms' announcement effects. The dependent variable is the three-day CARs of acquiring firms. Models 1 to 3 include all acquirers with targets from nonadvanced economies. Models 4 to 6 include transactions in advanced economies. We examine the interaction variables of IPR measures and the Hi-tech variable. The results of models 1 to 3 show that U.S. acquirers with targets from nonadvanced economies experience significantly higher announcement effects when target countries strengthen their IPR protections. This positive impact is even more pronounced and significant when using significant IPR events and Ginarte-Park Index to measure IPR (these proxies capture the quality of IPR in a host country more accurately).
In sum, the results are largely consistent with the univariate analysis. IPR significantly increases acquirers' announcement effects, and its significant impact remains after controlling for other influential variables. Note that we focus on the market reaction to the announcement deal and examine the value impact of acquiring firms' shareholders. Examine whether the perceived value realizes afterwards is interesting too, however, challenging. For example, the pre-merger information is not available for many private targets, which consists the majority of the crossborder deals. Several studies void this issue by considering only the ex post change in performance of acquirers (Hoberg and Phillips, 2012; Francis et al., 2016; and Fresard et al., 2016) . We leave the post-merger performance test to future study. We could however gain some insights from Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) , who show that enhanced IPR accelerates technology transfer within multinational firms by using divisional data.
[INSERT 
Acquirers' Net Returns
Net Return is the difference between the dollar amount of abnormal returns and the transaction value, divided by the transaction value. It measures the dollar return on investment from the market's perspective. Table 8 presents the results. The results show that acquiring firms experience significantly higher net returns when taking over targets from nonadvanced economies if the target country has implemented IPR reforms. The difference is especially evident for hi-tech firms. For acquirers entering nonadvanced economies without IPR reforms, the average net return is negative.
[ INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] Such patterns are even more significant for large acquirers, though the announcement effects do not reveal the scale of the economic impact. Specifically, the shareholders of large acquirers gain $94.070 million on average when their companies buy hi-tech targets in countries with IPR reforms; conversely, they lose $46.720 million on average if those targets are in countries without IPR reforms.
Consistent with Francis et al. (2008) , Table 8 shows that the shareholders of small acquirers gain on average when they buy targets in advanced economies. Furthermore, the net returns are significantly higher if those advanced economies experience significant IPR reforms. The value created from combining U.S. acquirers and targets in nonadvanced economies, however, seems too small to cover small acquirers' costs of managing a multinational firm. For smaller U.S. firms, shareholders seem to benefit more from buying minority interests when entering nonadvanced economies.
Summary
In the last two decades, many developing countries implemented significant IPR reforms.
Although there are plenty of theoretical arguments about the positive and negative impacts of such reforms on local economies, empirical evidence on whether and how these reforms create value for the host countries and the countries they do business with is limited, especially at the firm level.
We attempt to find new evidence through the analyses of cross-border M&As conducted by U.S.
firms, which are an important form of foreign direct investment.
We find that IPR significantly affects the patterns of cross-border M&As. Specifically, countries with significant IPRs attract more cross-border M&As, especially hi-tech M&A activity.
Deals involving targets from nonadvanced economies and hi-tech industries drive these findings 25 in particular. Acquirers of such targets experience significantly higher announcement effects, and the target firms also obtain higher premiums after they implement IPR reforms.
Overall, the evidence suggests that improving IPR, whether measured by significant events, WTO compliance, or enforcement, can benefit both acquirers and targets, and especially targets in nonadvanced economies. This finding has important implications for firms in nonadvanced economies, which experience many financial, product, and labor market constraints.
Although the existing literature indicates that cross-border M&As could mitigate such constraints at the firm level, cross-border M&As between advanced economies and nonadvanced economies are still very limited. We show that improving the environment for IPR protection can promote such activities and create value for participating firms. The table reports the country-fixed regression results of the impact of IPR reforms on the country-level proportion of hi-tech targets in cross-border M&As. The dependent variable is the proportion of hi-tech targets of completed and controlled (shares acquired > 50%) cross-border M&As, excluding transactions in financial industries. Because macro information is not available for some country-year observations, the sample size varies when those factors are included. Year fixed effects are controlled for all regressions. IPR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is constructed for the years after the identified IPR event and 0 otherwise. When we measure a target country's IPR by its compliance with TRIPS, TRIPS replaces IPR and is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is after the identified compliant year. When we measure a target country's IPR protection by the Ginarte-Park Index, Ginarte-Park Index replaces IPR and is a continuous measurement ranging from 0 to 5. Errors are clustered by country. 
Table 5 Regressions of Premiums Received by Targets
This table presents the regression analysis of target premiums. Premium is the difference between the transaction value and the market value of a target four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement, divided by the market value. This sample includes controlled and completed M&As with all public targets that have market values available four weeks prior to the transaction. Due to information availability, the number of observations reduces significantly. The final sample includes those transactions meeting our selection criteria from 1986 to 2008, covering 71 countries. IPR, TRIPS, and Ginarte-Park Index are same as defined in Table 4 . Hitech is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a target is active in the hi-tech industries defined by Chan et al. (1990) . All Cash is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the payment method is 100% cash. Tender is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SDC identifies the deal as a tender offer. Friendly is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SDC identifies the deal attitude as friendly. LnTran is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Trade Openness is from Penn World Tables. We identify the tax-haven countries according to Desai et al. (2006) and common-law countries according to La Porta et al. (1998) . Constants are not reported. Nonadvanced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IMF does not identify the target country as an advanced economy. (7) (5)- (1) (6)-(1) (7)- (1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) This table presents the results of the regression analysis of acquirers' announcement effects, which is measured as the three-day cumulative abnormal returns (-1, 1). Note that this table includes only controlled M&As with transaction values larger than 1% of the acquirers' market value. IPR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is constructed for the years after the identified IPR event and 0 otherwise. When we measure a target country's IPR by its compliance with TRIPS, TRIPS replaces IPR and is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is after the identified compliant year. When we measure a target country's IPR protection by the Ginarte-Park Index, Ginarte-Park Index replaces IPR and is a continuous measurement ranging from 0 to 5. Large refers to those acquirers with market values higher than the 25% of the public firms in the observation. LnTran is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Hitech is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a target is active in the hi-tech industries defined by Chan et al. (1990) . Public Target is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SDC identifies the target as a public company. All Cash is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the payment method is 100% cash. Friendly is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SDC defines the deal attitude as friendly. Tender is a dummy variable that equals 1 if SDC identifies the deal as a tender offer. Toehold is the amount of shares acquirers own before the focal M&A transaction. It is the difference between the number of shares owned after the transaction and the number of shares acquired in the transaction. SDC provides both. Advanced Economy is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the IMF identifies the target country as an advanced economy. Constants are not reported. The reported p-values in the parentheses reflect White's heteroskedasticity correction. 
